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ACHIEVING THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE PuBLIc
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS: CLOSELY TAILORED
LEGISLATION AS A REMEDY
MICHELLE K. WALSH*
Balancing the individual's right to exclusive control of his land against
the public interest in its preservation has become increasingly controversial in the
last thirty years. Considering the conservative nature of the recently elected
Republican Congress, the issue is likely to come to a head in the near future.
Part I of this paper discusses the emergence of the "takings" problem by tracing
its historical origins. Part II details two alternative solutions to the problem: a
judicial remedy and a legislative remedy. Part III scrutinizes and points out the
disadvantages of these two solutions. And finally, Part IV suggests a modified
legislative remedy-passage of a narrowly tailored takings law requiring specific
agencies to assess the impact of various regulations on private property. The final
Part of the paper also proposes that Congress continue its practice of amending
controversial environmental statutes to ensure that the law addresses the concerns
of both environmentalists and property owners.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUE
A. Original View: Expansive Land Rights
When the Europeans first arrived in America, the individual's right to
control his own land was fundamental. Perhaps due to the scarcity of land in
England, contrasted to its abundance in America,1 many of the early settlers
considered ownership of land an "essential and unalienable" right of every
citizen.2 Indeed, Thomas Jefferson, an early proponent of individual property
rights, stated, "the true foundation of republican government is the equal right of
* Ms. Walsh received her B.A. in English from the University of Virginia in 1992 and expects to
receive her J.D. from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary in
May of 1995.
1. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in I ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
LITERATURE 433,441 (George McMichael etal. eds., 1989) [hereinafter ANTHOLOGY OFAMERICAN
LITERATURE] ("In Europe the lands are either cultivated or locked up against the cultivator ....
But we have an immensity of land courting the industry of the husbandman.").
2. See ADDITIONS PROPOSED BY THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION: A PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS (JUNE
27, 1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND TIE CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES 219 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) ("there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they
form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are.., the means of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property .... ).
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every citizen, in his person and property, and in their management."3 This view
of nearly unrestricted property use is perhaps best stated by the philosopher John
Locke, upon whose theories many of our Founding Fathers relied in creating our
system of government:
4
Property, whose Original is from the Right a Man has to use any
of the inferior Creatures for the Subsistence and Comfort of his
Life, is for the benefit and sole advantage of the proprietor, so
that he may even destroy the thing, that he has Property in by his
use of it, when need requires.'
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution highlights the fundamental
importance of property rights for these early citizens. It states in pertinent part:
"nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."6
B. Environmental Movement
The drafters of the United States Constitution never specifically
contemplated air too unhealthy to breathe, water too polluted to drink or wildlife
on the brink of extinction. They lived in a world of abundant, fertile land, very
different from the modem industrial America. In their wisdom, though, they did
anticipate generally changing circumstances which would demand new laws.
Thomas Jefferson, for example, criticized those who "ascribe to the men of the
preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be
beyond amendment."'7 He stated that, "as new discoveries are made, new truths
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times."8
True to this prediction, in the 1960s various scientific discoveries led to
an advanced understanding of, and concern by the American people for, the
environmental consequences of their activities. "Rivers caught on fire, air
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in ANTHOLOGY OF
AMERICAN LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 447, 449 [hereinafter KerchevalLetter] (emphasis added).
4. See, e.g., ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATUR , supranote 1, at 430 (comparing the reference
in THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" with John
Locke's assertion in Treatises of Civil Government(1690) "that human rights include life, liberty,
and property.").
5. David J. Russ, How the "Property Rights'" Movement Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 405 n.38 (1994) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, Book I, § 93 (New American Library 1965)).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This prohibition applies to the federal government. Through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, its application extends to state governments as well.
Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
7. KerchevalLetter, supra note 3, at 450.
8. Id. at 451.
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emergencies were declared, people waited for chemical time bombs to go off in
their bodies, and the country watched as species after species, including the
American Bald Eagle, teetered on the brink of extinction."9 In response to these
discoveries and disasters, "Congress had a strong mandate from the American
people for environmental change."10 This new awareness led to the passage of
a proliferation of environmental laws including the National Environmental Policy
Act (CNEPA")," the Clean Air Act of 1970,12 the Clean Water Act of 1972,13 the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA") in 1973,4 the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA") in 1976,15 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") in 1980.16 These laws,
designed primarily to protect and preserve the environment, conditioned and
restricted formerly lawful landowner activities. The two hundred years of almost
unfettered freedom for landowners was challenged, and a shift occurred from
protection of individual landowners' rights toward greater protection of the public
environmental good. One noteworthy example, clearly illustrative of the conflict
between property rights advocates and environmentalists, arises in the context of
the ESA.
1. Private Property and the Endangered Species Act
The scientific discoveries that prompted the environmental movement
revealed among other things that, in addition to their inherent natural beauty,
many species of plants provide valuable medical benefits. For example, the
Pacific Yew, which was considered worthless in the past, produces taxol, a drug
effectively used to treat ovarian and breast cancer. 7 In addition, "more than 3
million American heart disease sufferers would find their lives cut short within
72 hours without digitalis, a drug derived from the purple foxglove plant."'"
Indeed, according to studies reported by the National Wildlife Federation, forty
percent of all prescriptions written today are for drugs derived either in whole or
in part from natural compounds from various species. 9 Future discoveries may
9. Russ, supra note 5, at 408 (citing R. REVELLE & H. LANSBERG, AMERICA's CHANGING
ENviRoNMENT iii-xii (1970)).
10. Michele Kay, PropertyRights MovementAimed at Curbing Environmentalists , NEWS WORLD,
July 30, 1994, at 43.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988).
12. Id. §§ 7401-7671.
13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1387 (1988).
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(i).
16. Id. §§ 9601-9661.
17. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, OPPOSE REP. TAuzN's "BUDGET BUSTER," H.R. 3875
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demonstrate that other species of plants and animals are equally beneficial.
However, as a result of industrialization and extensive development which
destroys the habitat of these species, many plants and animals are increasingly
threatened with extinction.
In response, Congress enacted the ESA in 1973.20 The purpose of the
ESA is to conserve ecosystems "upon which endangered species and threatened
species [of fish, animals, and plants] depend" '21 and to "halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost."'22 Thus, Congress placed the
protection of species above the protection of individual property rights. In its
effectuation of this purpose, two major sections of the Act impact private uses of
land-Section 9' and Section 7.24
Section 9 of the Act prohibits any individual or federal agency from
"taking" wildlife listed as "endangered" or "threatened" by the Fish and Wildlife
Service ("EWS") of the Department of the Interior.' The definition of "taking"
includes almost any act which adversely affects a species.26 Thus, any significant
habitat modification of a listed species may constitute a taking under the ESA
even without any intentional or actual physical contact with a plant or an animal
if it results in actual injury to the listed species.27 Penalties for violation include
forfeiture of fish, wildlife or plants, strict liability civil penalties of up to $500,
civil penalties of no more than twenty-five dollars for intentional violations and
misdemeanor criminal penalties of not more than one year in jail and/or a
$50,000 fine for knowing violations." Furthermore, protection of property does
not constitute a valid defense under a section 9 taking of a listed species.29 Thus,
the Act holds a property owner liable for harming a listed species even when that
species has damaged or is damaging his land. In effect, this section restricts and,
in some cases, eliminates entirely the ability of a landowner to use his land as he
sees fit if it would threaten any species designated by the government as
threatened or endangered.
In addition, section 7 of the Act requires federal agencies to limit the
likelihood that any action it authorizes, funds or carries out will jeopardize the
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
21. Id. § 1531(b).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. ESA § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
24. ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
25. ESA § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
26. Robert Meltz, ESA and Private Property: Where the Wild Things Are: The EndangeredSpecies
Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 378 (1994) [hereinafter ESA and Private Property].
27. Id.
28. ESA § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
29. ESA § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538. Cf ESA § 11(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(3) (protection of
persons as civil defense); ESA § 11(b)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(3) (protection of persons as criminal
defense).
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continued existence of any listed species. ° This provision may curtail the use of
private property in situations in which a landowner must obtain a land
development permit from a particular agency to authorize the development.
As a result of these broadly worded provisions, the protection of
endangered species and the use of private land frequently conflict. One
commentator states: "With more than 800 domestic species listed as endangered
or threatened under the ESA, and thousands more awaiting consideration, the
specter has been raised by some that the ESA presents a ubiquitous threat to the
institution of private property."31 For example, in a small Utah town near St.
George, implementation of ESA has curtailed private real estate development,32
After the FWS listed the desert tortoise as endangered, Utah's Division of
Wildlife Resources set aside 20,000 acres of land to preserve its habitat.33
C. Emergence of the Grassroots "Property Rights" Movement in Response to
Growing Environmental Laws
In the late 1980s these numerous land use restrictions imposed by
environmental laws led to what one commentator describes as a "growing anger
about what many people see as heavy-handed rules that are striking increasingly
close to their daily lives."'34 A direct result of this antiregulatory sentiment was
the emergence of a reactionary property rights movement which "at its core...
is railing against land use laws, particularly those protecting wetlands and
endangered species, which the movement claims rob property owners of the full
use and value of their land." '3  Farmers and ranchers joined with small
landowners, all of whom had been prohibited from developing their land because
of some environmental law, to form "mom and pop organizations" advocating
stronger property rights.36 Indeed, according to the Alliance for America, the
movement's umbrella group, nearly 600 local property rights groups have formed
since the late 1980s. 37
30. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2).
31. ESA and Private Property, supra note 26, at 379.
32. Marianne Lavelle, The Property Rights Revolt, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Catalina Camia, Legislators Draw in the Reins on Environmental Rules, GOV'T & COM., Apr.
30, 1994, at 1060.
35. H. Jane Lehman, Private Property Proponents Gain Ground, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1994, at
El.
36. Jonathan Adler, Property Rights Cause Spooking the Greens, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1994.
37. Keith Schneider, Fighting To Keep US. Rulesffrom DevaluingLand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995,
at Al.
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Faithful to the truism that "political power grows from the grassroots," '3
what began as a "100 percent grassroots activity"39
has grown into a "powerful force that is throwing its weight around in
Washington, state capitals and the courts." '4 With the financial support of "much
wealthier and well-established agriculture and industrial trade associations,
lobbyists for large energy, mining and timber companies and conservative public
interest law firms," 1 the property rights coalition has targeted both the courts and
the legislature with the hopes of achieving greater protection for private
landowners.42
D. Issue
The issue that awaits resolution in this political drama is clearly
articulated by one commentator as "a fundamental dilemma in American
jurisprudence: How should the law accommodate the interests of property owners
and the achievement of broader social objectives?" 3 On one side are the property
rights advocates who invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment which
prohibits the taking of private property for public use "without just
compensation." 44 They contend that prohibiting landowners from developing or
extracting materials from their own privately owned land is tantamount to
condemnation which entitles the deprived property owner to compensation from
the government.45 Failure to provide this compensation, they assert, would be
contrary to the purpose of the Fifth Amendment which is to "bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 6 On the other side are the
environmentalists who believe that the protection of the environment, and thus the
public good, should trump the personal desires of the landowners. Furthermore,
they "dismiss the compensation argument as a foil for irresponsible land use and
warn that federal and state coffers would be bankrupted by compensation rules."'47
Two potential solutions exist to resolve this dilemma. The first is the
currently existing solution in which the courts, on a case by case basis, grapple
over the meaning of the Takings Clause and the appropriate policy to use when
38. Tom Kenworthy & Gary Lee, Environmental Bills Still Due, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at
A4.
39. Lavelle, supra note 32, at 1.
40. Schneider, supra note 37, at A12.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of Uncertainty, 26 URB.
LAW. 327, 328 (1994).
44. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
45. Lavelle, supra note 32, at 1.
46. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
47. Kay, supra note 10, at 43.
[Vol. 19:317
ACHIEVING THE PROPER BALANCE
balancing these competing interests.48 Under this approach, the affected property
owner must bring a takings .claim against the government and must prove that the
regulation in question affects private land in a way that violates the Fifth
Amendment, thus meriting an award of just compensation.49  An alternative
solution is for Congress to enact a takings law under which legislators must bear
the responsibility of ensuring that the public environmental interest does not
unfairly trammel the rights of individual property owners."
II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
A. Judicial-Constitutional Litigation System
To resolve this issue today, the normal procedure is for the affected
property owner to bring suit against the federal government alleging a violation
of his Fifth Amendment rights.51 The claim, in effect, is that by imposing
regulatory restrictions on the land, the government has taken that property and
thus owes just compensation to its owner. 2 Pursuant to the Tucker Act, this
action must first be brought in the United States Claims Court. 3 In order to
prevail, the affected landowner must first demonstrate that his claim is "ripe."54
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City,5 the Supreme Court described the two components of the ripeness
doctrine.56 First, before a court is authorized to hear the claim, the plaintiff must
have submitted a development proposal to the appropriate agency and learned the
"final, definitive position" of that agency.57 This finality component requires a
plaintiff to exhaust all administrative procedures available.5 The rationale
supporting this requirement is that "[a] court cannot determine whether a
regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes."5 9
Second, the deprived landowner must demonstrate that not only was the above
48. Martinez, supra note 43, at 328.
49. Id. at 329.
50. Id. at 328.
51. Id. at 329.
52. Id.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988). Passed in 1887, the Tucker Act extended the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims to include claims founded upon the Constitution. Id.
54. For a discussion of the "ripeness" requirements, see generally Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory
Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts 3 (Aug. 1, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review).
55. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
56. Id.
57. Id at 191.
58. Id.
59. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986).
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determination final, but that it did not provide him with adequate compensation.60
The rationale for this second component is that the Fifth Amendment does not
prohibit governmental takings but merely takings that go uncompensated.6'
After overcoming these threshold ripeness requirements, the property
owner can then proceed to address the substantive merits of the claim. The
Supreme Court has yet to articulate one clear rule to apply in every takings claim.
Rather, the determination of whether the government has violated the Fifth
Amendment and unjustly taken property without providing compensation depends
on the facts of each case.62
For an ad hoe, regulatory taking determination, courts rely on numerous
factors, weighing each differently as the facts of each case demand.63 In 1978,
in the case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Supreme
Court attempted to iterate a set of broadly worded factors to provide guidance to
lower courts for general takings cases." These factors included the economic
impact of the government action, the extent to which the government action
interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations and the character of the
government action. 5 Two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon,66 the Court
refined these factors when it established criteria specifically for takings
determinations in land use control cases.67 In A gins, the Court held that an
unconstitutional taking occurs if the regulation denies the property owner of all
economically viable use of his property, or if it does not substantially advance a
legitimate government interest.6" Until 1987 application of these factors generally
led to the courts' denial of any compensation award.69
However, recent Supreme Court regulatory takings jurisprudence reveals
increasing sympathy toward private property owners.7" For example, in 1992,
David Lucas, a South Carolina property owner brought his regulatory takings suit
against the government before the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.7 He argued that, by enacting the Beachfront Management Act72
60. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195.
61. Id. at 194 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
297 (1981)).
62. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing United States
v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958), and United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344
U.S. 149, 156 (1952)).
63. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1979).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104, and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928)).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
70. Martinez, supra note 43, at 337.
71. 112 S. Ct 2886 (1992).
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which prohibited the construction. of single-family residences on his two
beachfront lots, the state denied him the use of his land and thus owed him
compensation.' Ruling in Lucas' favor, the Supreme Court held that a regulation
that denies "all economically productive or beneficial uses of land" is a per se
taking that entitles the landowner to a payment of just compensation. 74
In 1994, the Court once again held in favor of the property owner in
Dolan v. City of Tigard.7' Dolan was the owner of a plumbing supply store who
applied for a permit to expand her store and pave its parking lot.76 The city
conditioned its approval on her willingness to dedicate ten percent of her land for
a bicycle path, green space and drainage area." The Court ruled that the city had
taken Dolan's land without paying just compensation.78 The Court held that
without the government's demonstration of a "rough proportionality" between the
required dedication and the particular harm posed by the development,
conditioning expansion or building upon a public easement was an
unconstitutional taking. 9
B. Legislative Solution
As an alternative to the judicial remedy, Congress or individual states
may enact takings laws to address directly the issue of whether a proposed
regulation on privately owned land triggers the Fifth Amendment.8 The
popularity of this alternative has grown since the emergence of the property rights
movement and the states have taken the lead on embracing this type of
legislation." As of June 1994 almost one hundred bills addressing regulatory
takings had been introduced in close to forty states, 2 and as of April 12, 1994,
property rights legislation had actually been enacted in Arizona,83 Utah,84
72. See S.C. CODE AN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-30-220 (Law Co-op. 1987).
73. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886.
74. Id. at 2901.
75. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
76. Id. at 2313.
77. Id. at 2314.
78. Id. at 2322.
79. Id. at 2319.
80. Martinez, supra note 43.
81. Id. at 329.
82. DEFENDERS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE POCKET GUIDE TO YouR PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
(1994).
83. See DEFENDERS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, I PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORTER NO. 2 (1994) at 7
[hereinafter PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORTER]. But cf Schneider, supra note 37, at A12 (noting the
defeat of a property rights bill in Arizona's 1994 November elections).
84. PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORTER, supra note 83, at 7 ("An act passed in 1993 required state
agencies to analyze takings implications of proposed regulations. An act passed in 1994 requires
local governments to do the same.").
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Virginia,"5 Indiana, Delaware, Washington and Mississippi. 6 Congress is slowly
following the states' example. In the 103rd Congress, twenty-two pieces of
legislation addressing the protection of property rights stood pending before
Congress. 7 Although the Democratic majority successfullyblocked the enactment
of all these bills, the chances of some version of takings legislation passing in the
104th Congress increased after the Republicans took control in the November
1994 elections. 8
Essentially, there are two versions of takings legislation: the
"compensation" version and the "assessment" version. Both shift the burden of
ensuring the protection of private property rights from the individual to the
regulatory agency.
1. Compensation Approach
In a typical compensation style of takings legislation, the legislature sets
a statutory standard for compensating property owners. 9  Basically a
compensation law automatically entitles a private landowner to just compensation
upon either the occurrence of a specified governmental action or the resulting
diminution in property value by a certain statutorily set percentage. This
automatic trigger completely eliminates any examination of the facts surrounding
a particular claim.9' The sole consideration in compensation legislation is whether
the fair market value of the property is diminished by the required percentage.92
If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, compensation is granted, and
there will be no need to examine the public benefit of the regulation or its effect
on the environment.
Furthermore, these adopted statutory standards expand the amount of
protection currently provided to property owners pursuant to modem Fifth
85. See id. (noting that "[tihis is a study bill that created a joint subcommittee to study if current
[laws] are adequate.").
86. Id.
87. Lehman, supra note 35, at El.
88. Id. at E24.
89. Examples of compensation takings bills are: H.R. 3875, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994),
introduced by Rep. Tauzin (D-La); and the more recent Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act
introduced by the House Republicans in their "Contract with America." REP. NEWT GINGRICH Er
AL., CONTRACT wrrH AMERICA 134-35 (Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). See also the Private
Property Protection Act of 1995 passed by the House on March 3, 1995, in furtherance of the
private property objectives of the Contract of America. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201
(1995).
90. See Martinez, supra note 43, at 336; ESA and Private Property, supra note 26, at 413 n.234.
91. Martinez, supra note 43, at 337.
92. Id.
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Amendment regulatory takings jurisprudence.' The Supreme Court has never
held that a diminution in the value of property alone constitutes a taking and
indeed has expressly rejected that proposition.94 According to Senator Joseph
Liebermann of Connecticut, "[a] 'taking' is a concept defined by the courts
interpreting the Fifth Amendment. It has never been interpreted to include a
diminution in property value."95 To support his statement, the Senator points to
Lucas where "the Supreme Court concluded that a regulatory action might
categorically be a taking only if the owner was denied all economically viable
uses of the property."96  Examination of the key provisions in typical
compensation bills illustrates the protection that the bills usually provide private
landowners.
a. The Private Property Owners 'Bill of Rights
At the heart of most compensation laws is the determination of when an
affected landowner is entitled to a payment of just compensation by the
government.9 7 One particular bill, H.R. 3875, introduced by Representative
Tauzin of Louisiana, requires that the government pay compensation to property
owners who, as a result of final agency action, are "deprived of 50% or more of
the fair market value, or the economically viable use, of the affected portion of'
his land.98 As in most compensation bills, the required payment is automatic. 99
The nature of the regulated activity, its effect on the environment and the public
benefit received by its regulation are irrelevant if a "qualified appraisal expert"
determines that the value of the land has decreased by 50%."' In addition, by
incorporating the phrase "economically viable use," the bill indicates that not only
will a diminution in the market value of the land entitle the property owner to
93. Robert Meltz, Property Rights Legislation in the 103rd Congress, 1994 CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS (July 22, 1994). The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution sets a minimum standard of
property owner protection below which regulators cannot fall. However, "there is no constitutional
objection to Congress providing compensation over and above the 5th Amendment standard." ESA
and Private Property,supra note 26, at 413 n.234 (citing United States v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469
U.S. 24, 30 (1984)).
94. See Martinez, supra note 43, at 337 (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), and
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
95. 140 CONG. REc. S5923 (daily ed. May 18, 1994) (statement of Sen. Liebermann).
96. Id.
97. H.R. 3875, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
98. Id. § 8(a).
99. Id. See also H.R. 1388, Just Compensation Act (providing for compensation of an owner
suffering "any diminution in value" of property); H.R. 3784 (compensation for owner who is
"substantially deprived of... economically viable use"); H.R. 3978 Endangered Species Act
("taking" defined as 25% reduction in value of land).
.100. H.L 3875 § 8(a).
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compensation, but the deprivation of the owner's ability to earn a living as a
result of the regulation may also trigger this right.''
Finally, it is important to note the bill's reference to "the affected
portion" of the land. 2 Essentially, in appraising the value of the land, the
relevant comparison is the fair market value of the affected portion of the land,
not of the entire tract, prior and subsequent to imposition of the regulation." 3
Thus, if the regulation affects only two percent of the land, but that small portion
has diminished in value by fifty percent, Tauzin's bill requires the government
to compensate the owner." 4 Focusing on the affected portion rather than the
entire tract owned by the property owner will result in more frequent findings of
takings.
b. Contract with America-Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act
A more extreme example of the compensation approach appears in the
Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, which is part of the recently proposed
Contract with America. 5 Pursuant to the private property provisions of that plan,
property owners are entitled "to receive compensation (up to ten percent of fair
market value) from the federal government for any reduction in the value of their
property."'0 6 Thus, although the plan limits the requisite compensation to ten
percent of the fair market value of the land, it triggers the requirement if the
property owner experiences any reduction in value of his land as a result of
government regulation.0 7
2. Assessment Approach
A more flexible version of takings legislation, and the type passed in most
states, ' 8 is legislation that adopts the assessment approach. Pursuant to this
model federal agencies, before implementing a proposed regulation or action,
must analyze and assess the regulation's potential impacts on private property
owners to determine whether the regulation mandates compensation. 9 In an
assessment approach analysis, the agency considers the nature and purpose of the
proposed regulation or action as well as the effects on both the environment and
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 170-73.
104. H.R. 3875 § 8.
105. See GINGRICH, supra note 89.
106. Id. at 135.
107. Id.
108. Cf PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORTER, supra note 83, at 1. The only compensation bill that has
been passed is in Mississippi and was signed into law on April 8, 1994. Id.
109. Martinez, supra note 43, at 336.
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private land."' Thus, unlike the compensation approach which predetermines the
need to compensate the affected landowner without examination of the particular
facts, the assessment approach requires the agency to determine whether
compensation would be required before implementing the regulation or
conducting the action."' As opposed to a compensation bill, an assessment bill
does not propose to expand existing rights for property owners or
environmentalists but rather attempts merely to maintain the status quo for both
interests. Senator Bums characterizes assessment laws as "look before you leap"
legislation, unobjectionable because they do not set new standards but rather
reflect the present conditions. 2
Assessment bills generally codify Executive Order 12,630 signed by
President Reagan in 1988.113 The Order calls for takings assessments of all
governmental regulations that could affect a taking.1 The purpose of a taking
assessment is to determine the risk of liability under the Fifth Amendment takings
clause before an agency undertakes any new regulatory program.115 Until actually
codified by Congress, the status of the Executive Order is precarious because it
can be rescinded by President Clinton at any time.11 6 As a result, it is used
infrequently causing it to have limited effect.117
An example of an assessment bill is S. 2019, the takings amendment
added by the Senate to the Safe Drinking Water Act on May 19, 1994.118 This
assessment bill requires all federal agencies to "complete a private property taking
impact analysis [("TIA")] before issuing or promulgating any policy, regulation,
proposed legislation, or related agency action which is likely to result in a taking
of private property."".9 Each TIA shall include the purpose of the agency action,
the likelihood that a taking may occur and alternatives that would lessen adverse
effects on private property.' Thus, not only must the agency consider the
regulation's impact on the environment and private property, but under the bill
the agency must consider alternatives to most effectively balance the two
conflicting interests. Presumably, the agency will choose to implement the
regulation in a manner that least infringes on private property while
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 140 CONG. REC. S5905 (daily ed. May 12, 1994) (statement of Senator Bums: "[this bill] just
says, 'Government, look before you leap in the area of private property on any kind of a rule or
regulation that is promulgated out of Washington."')
113. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
114. Id.
115. Lavelle, supra note 32, at 1.
116. Camia, supra note 34, at 1063.
117. Id.
118. S. 2019, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., § 19 (1994).
119. Id. § 19(e)(1)(B).
120. Id. § 19(e)(2).
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simultaneously ensuring protection of the environmental interest targeted by the
regulation.
C. Programmatic Adjustments
A third legislative option to remedy the takings issue involves statutory
amendments to controversial acts that reflect a new balancing of the interests of
private property owners and the general public. Thus, Congress can reexamine
those acts which have given rise to numerous takings claims and can incorporate
new provisions directly into the acts that reduce any overly harsh impact on
private property. The most notable example of this type of adjustment is the
"incidental take" provision of the ESA which exempts property owners from
liability for performing certain acts on their land.121 Additional examples of
concessions built into legislation to protect property owners are the ESA's
provisions governing critical habitat designation and the protection of the property
owner's land.'22
1. Incidental Take Provision
As explained earlier, section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to
ensure that any actions affiliated with it do not violate the Act.' This provision
affects property owners who need federal authorization before they may develop
their land. 4 Compliance with this provision requires the federal agency to
consult with the FWS before issuing the development permit to ensure that the
landowner's proposed development is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of a listed species or adversely modify or destroy its critical habitat. 5
If the FWS concludes that the proposed activity is in complete compliance with
the ESA except for an incidental taking of a species, it will suggest to the agency
reasonable measures that will minimize the incidental danger. 6 If the agency
follows these measures, it may grant the permit to the landowner and the agency
and landowner will still be protected from liability under the ESA. 7
In 1982, Congress added an incidental take provision to the ESA which
applies to private landowners who do not need federal authorization for their
activity. 2 ' According to the provision, a taking may be excused if it is incidental
121. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 127-30.
123. See supra text accompanying note 30.
124. ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
125. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
126. ESA § 10(a)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
127. ESA § 10(a)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
128. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
[Vol. 19:317
ACHIEVING THE PROPER BALANCE
to, and thus not the purpose of, a landowner's lawful activity. '29 The FWS will
issue an incidental take permit after the landowner submits an acceptable "habitat
conservation plan."'"3 This plan must describe the impact of the taking, the steps
the landowner will take to mitigate the taking, funding for these "minimizing"
steps and explanations for alternative measures that were considered by the
landowner and rejected."'
2. Critical Habitat Designation
Other examples of programmatic adjustments to the ESA are its
provisions pertaining to the Secretary of the Interior's designation of "critical
habitat."'32 Although the Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to determine
which species to list as threatened or endangered "solely on the basis of the best
scientific and commercial data' 33 and thus without considering any impact on
property, designation of critical habitat should be based both on scientific data
and an assessment of the "economic impact and any other relevant impact" on the
landowner.34
3. Protection of Private Property
A final ESA provision which softens the Act's impact on private
property rights involves the ability of property owners to protect their property.
Although protection of private property does not provide a defense to an ESA
section 9 violation, the FWS does permit government agents to remove members
of threatened species and experimental populations that have actually harmed
private property. 3
III. PROBLEMS WITH THESE SOLUTIONS
Although each of the previously discussed options provides an arguable
solution to the takings dilemma, they each carry their own set of problems.
129. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
130. ESA § 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
131. ESA § 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
132. ESA § 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).
133. ESA § 4(b)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
134. ESA § 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
135. 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b) (1993) (government agents may "humanely" remove grizzly bears that
have damaged property); id. § 17.84(c)(5) (government agents may remove harmful red wolves.).
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A. Judicial
The constitutional litigation remedy creates uncertainty for both
landowners, who cannot reasonably predict the outcomes of their cases, and
regulators, who do not receive adequate guidelines to assist them in determining
whether or not a regulation effects a taking. 36 Furthermore, this judicial solution




Before expending the considerable effort involved in litigating a
regulatory takings suit, property owners must be able to realistically predict
whether or not their claims will succeed. Despite the Supreme Court's
articulation of the factors to be considered in deciding a landowner's claim for
compensation, mechanical application of these criteria cannot accurately predict
the outcomes of takings cases. 38 Courts weigh each factor differently depending
on the facts of each controversy.139 No one factor is dispositive as "courts on
occasion adopt what seems the wrong test, use more than one test in a single
opinion, mix elements from the various approaches, or dispense with prescribed
formulations entirely and look to fundamental fairness."' 40  Indeed some
commentators believe that the ideological beliefs of the judges regarding
government interference with private property is essential to the courts' decisions
to award or deny compensation.' Thus, if the courts favor the environmental
view with its emphasis on government regulation, they will deny compensation.'42
Likewise, if the court espouses more of a laissez-faire view of the proper role of
the government, it will award just compensation.'
Although in the past, the judicial trend favoring municipalities and
regulators provided some degree of predictability for the litigants, this trend has
136. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20 (1994); The Supreme Court 1994
Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 290-92, 298-300 (1994). See infra text
accompanying notes 165-78.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 179-90.
138. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
139. Id. at 2318-20; Goldbott v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("There is no set
formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins."); Robert Meltz, When the United
States Takes Property: Legal Principles, 1991 C.R.S. REPORT FOR CONGREss 39, Mar. 22, 1991
[hereinafter Legal Principles].
140. Legal Principles, supra note 139, at 40. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
141. Legal Principles, supra note 139, at 40.
142. Id. at 41.
143. Id.
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begun to shift.1" For the first sixty-five years after the Supreme Court affirmed
the validity of the regulatory taking cause of action,'45 property rights advocates
met with little success in challenging the right of the government to restrict
property use in order to protect the environment. 146  However, in 1987 the
Supreme Court decided three landmark takings cases demonstrating more
sympathy toward the rights of private landowners. 47 Thus, court responsiveness
is no longer a reliable indication of whether an imposed regulation on private
property demands the payment of just compensation to its owner.
In addition, uncertainty exists concerning the boundaries of recent
Supreme Court decisions. 4  Because holdings in takings decisions are extremely
fact specific and judges are precluded from deciding issues that do not appear
before them, the opinions in many takings cases often leave various open-ended
questions unanswered. 49 Examination of the holdings in Lucas"50 and Dolan'
illustrate the inability of court decisions to provide clear guidelines regarding
whether a land use regulation merits just compensation.
a. Uncertainty Resulting from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission
In Lucas, the Court held that the government must pay just compensation
when a regulation deprives an owner of "all economically productive or beneficial
uses of land."'5 However, just how far the regulation may curtail land use before
it meets the "all" standard is questionable because the Supreme Court did not
make a finding of complete deprivation in that case.' Rather, it accepted the
lower court's finding that the regulation deprived the owner of "all economically
viable use."'54
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia stated that a ninety-five percent
deprivation does not necessarily constitute "all," indicating that the standard is
difficult to meet.' In addition, the Court qualified its holding with a nuisance
144. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79.
145. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("While property may be
regulated to a certain extent if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
146. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69.
147. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone, 480 U.S. 470.
148. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
150. 112 S. Ct. 2886.
151. 114 S. Ct. 2309.
152. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
153. Id. at 2896.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 2895 n.8 ("It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with a 95% loss will get
nothing, while the landowner with a total loss will recover in full."). But see High Court "Victory"
for Property Rights Movement, Advocates Say, Vol. XII, No. 3 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ALERT
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exception suggesting that, in some instances, even a complete deprivation of all
uses of land may not require payment of just compensation.'56 The Court stated
that, when the government can show that "the proscribed use interests were not
part of [the plaintiffs] title to begin with," it need not pay that owner just
compensation for regulating the use of the land." 7 As a result of this nuisance
exception, "Lucas left the door wide open for government regulations that
diminish private property value substantially-as long as they are rooted in the
principle of nuisance law."'58 Thus, in order to meet his burden, a landowner
must demonstrate not only that he was deprived of all use of his land but also that
the proscribed use was not a "nuisance."' 59 Although, the Court narrowly defined
a "nuisance" as only those activities which would have constituted a nuisance at
common law, 6' this definition is precarious in light of Justice White's retirement
and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in which he objected to this
interpretation of nuisance as being too narrow.''
A final issue which Lucas addressed in dicta and which creates
uncertainty for regulators and landowners is the question of parcel. 2 Precisely
what portion of the property must the courts or legislatures examine to determine
whether the property owner has been deprived of all economically viable use of
his land? 63 Is it the entire tract of land owned by the individual or only the
portion of the tract being regulated? One controversial issue is how to determine
property as a whole when the extent of the plaintiff s ownership varies over time.
Dicta in Lucas indicates that the Court might consider qualifying its current rule
that parcels must be viewed as a whole.'
(EPA, Washington D.C.) February 1, 1995, at 30. Property rights advocates hailed the Supreme
Court's recent denial of certiorari in a Florida land takings case as proof that "compensation is
warranted when the government through regulations 'takes less than the full value of the property'."
Id. On the other hand, environmentalists called the Court's decision "bizarre" because "it is neither
an agreement or a disagreement to [the] lower court ruling." Id. In this case, the Claims Court
found that, when the U.S. Corps of Engineers denied a permit to mine land designated as wetlands
area, it deprived the owner of all economically viable use, despite the fact that the government
proffered various other economic uses for which the land could be used. Florida Rock Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 18 F.3d 1560 (1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 848 (1995).
156. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
157. Id.
158. Lavelle, supra note 32, at 5.
159. Cf. id.
160. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-02.
161. Lavelle, supra note 32, at 5.
162. This doctrine is also referred to as the "parcel as a whole" rule or the "rule against
segmentation." ESA and Private Property, supra note 26, at 385 n.94.
163. See supra text accompanying note 103.
164. The Supreme Court first endorsed the "parcel as a whole" doctrine in 1978. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). However, since then the Court has
indicated its willingness to revisit the issue and perhaps accept segmentation of the property for the
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b. Uncertainty Resulting from Dolan y. City of Tigard' 61
The Court in Dolan addressed the question of the required degree of
connection between a regulation and the projected impact of the proposed
development. 66 The Court's holding requires that the regulator demonstrate a
"rough proportionality" between the dedication required by the owner and the
impact of the proposed development in order to avoid the payment of just
compensation. 167 Thus, the case was remanded in order to give the City of Tigard
the opportunity to demonstrate, among other things, that the resulting reduction
in traffic from the required dedication of land for a bicycle path reasonably relates
to the expected increase in traffic from the proposed expansion of Dolan's
store. 61 In addition, the Court in Dolan shifted the burden of proof in takings
cases from the property owner to the government.16 9
Controversy surrounding Dolan focuses primarily on whether the Court's
holding applies only to permit conditions that compel the conveyance of
possessory interests in land or whether it applies equally to exactions that do not
effect per se takings and which do not involve physical invasions or the
deprivation of all economically viable use of land. If Dolan only applies to
possessory interests, its impact on environmental laws is greatly reduced.
Proponents of the limited reading of Dolan rely on a statement in the
majority opinion that states "if the city had been content to prohibit Mrs. Dolan
from building on the relevant portions of her parcel, without requiring a
dedication to the city, that restriction would have been constitutional; it was the
fact that 'the city demanded more' that created the constitutional defect.'
70
Narrow Dolan interpretations rely on the Court's acceptance of certain traditional
requirements of physical dedications: "[d]edications for streets, sidewalks, and
other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive
congestion from a proposed property use.' 17 ' This interpretation asserts that
Dolan only holds that "if a required dedication does not accord with common
experience, a rationalization that makes a big jump in logic or otherwise seems
glib may prove vulnerable to attack."'72 Finally, during his Senate confirmation
purposes of determining whether a taking has occurred. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
165. 114 S. Ct. 2309.
166. Id.
167. Id. See also Washington Legal Foundation, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Takings Clause No
Longer a Poor Relation, 9 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, no. 24 (1994) [hereinafter LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER].
168. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2322.
169. Id. at 2319.
170. Jeffrey L. Braun, Rough Proportionality: Can It Play in New York?, N.Y. L.J., July 27, 1994,
at 7 (quoting Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320).
171. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
172. Braun, supra note 170, at 7.
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hearing, Justice Stephen Breyer indicated his adoption of this limited reading
when he stated that "the 'special' part of the Dolan case was the 'physical
occupation of a piece of property."
73
Supporters for the application of Dolan to nonpossessory interests in land,
as well as possessory interests, rely primarily on common sense. The premise
supporting a broad reading is that, by analogy, "requiring property to be left in
its natural state deprives the owner of the use of that property, regardless of
whether the land is required to be dedicated to achieve that purpose or whether
a conservation easement is demanded."'74 Similarly, if Dolan only applies to
possessory land interests, its holding would not affect requirements of
development, mitigation or impact fees in which case "regulators could easily
exploit the loophole to avoid unconstitutional takings by exacting sufficiently
large impact fees to enable the governmental entity to condemn that portion or
interest in the land it wanted to preserve in the first place, pay the landowner just
compensation and perhaps have some money left over for its general coffers."' 75
The most concrete support for a broad reading of Dolan happened four days after
the Dolan decision when the Court vacated the judgment in Erlich v. Culver
City.'76 This Case involved the city's attempt to impose fees in return for
approving development projects.'7 7 This regulation was neither a physical
invasion nor a complete destruction of all economically viable use of land. 7 ' In
vacating the lower court's decision, the Court suggested that Dolan is relevant to
the determination of whether an imposition of fees effects a regulatory taking.
With regard to Dolan's shifting of the burden from the property owner
to the government or municipality to justify the regulation, uncertainty exists as
to whether this shift refers to the burden of persuasion or merely to the burden
of production. Moreover, the consequences of this shift may be irrelevant:
"Once a constitutional challenge exceeds a certain threshold of seriousness, the
outcome is affected less by which side ostensibly has what burden, than by the
courts' basic perceptions of fairness."'79
2. Expense
In addition to the uncertainty problems created by reliance on the courts
for the resolution of takings claims, the high costs involved in litigating these
suits is problematic. Expense presents an obstacle for both litigating parties.
Governments that lose takings suits are exposed to considerable monetary liability
173. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, supra note 167, at 24.
174. Paul D. Kamenar, Nollan, Dolan and Beyond, THE RECORDER, Sept. 15, 1994, at 7.
175. Id.
176. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 470.
179. Braun, supra note 170, at 7.
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in the form of just compensation."' The court in Whitney Benefits v. United
States awarded to the property owner as just compensation $60 million plus
interest amounting to $180 million as of 1991.2 The loss in Bowles v. United
States cost the government $55,000 plus interest, compounded annually from
1984 as just compensation for the denial of a permit to fill in wetlands.'
Requiring the government to pay these large just compensation awards
discourages the passage and enforcement of land use regulations because the
government lacks the funds to pay these costs.' 83
From the perspective of the property owner, the considerable time and
expense required to litigate a regulatory takings claim makes the system
inaccessible for many potential plaintiffs. Litigation costs can range from
$50,000 to $500,000. 14 As a consequence of these high costs, "most individuals
do not pursue such claims."'1 5 During the Senate debate on the Safe Drinking
Water Act Senator Dole reflected on the injustice of the litigation system on
private property owners by explaining: "The Government, backed by the
seemingly limitless resources of the U.S. Justice Department, usually outlasts by
outspending, while the poor citizen pays for the lawyers for both sides through
fees and taxes."'86
3. Time
Compounded with the uncertainty and the high expenses facing property
owners is the considerable amount of time landowners and the government must
spend litigating the suit. Even before litigation is possible, the landowner must
overcome the ripeness hurdles set forth in Williamson County. "7 This process can
take years. As a result, "[p]laintiffs whose rights must be protected quickly if
they are to be protected at all may be fatally delayed by a doctrine designed to
limit their access to federal court."'88  The resulting delay in bringing the suit
may cause the property owner to suffer additional damages.8 9 The government
imposing the regulation subsequently faces even more liability. 90
180. See Stein, supra note 54, at 4.
181. 926 F.2d 1169, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
182. No. 303-88L (Cl. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1994).
183. See Martinez, supra note 43, at 342 (noting that, "The chilling effect of having a taking award
deducted from an agency's budget might prove a particularly formidable disincentive to even the
most dedicated public administrator.").
184. See Private PropertyRights Bill Draws Divided Response During House Hearing, Daily Rep.
for Exec. (BNA) No. 212, at D-39 (Nov. 4, 1993).
185. Id.
186. 140 CONG. REC. S5925 (daily ed. May 18, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 54-61.
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In summary, the constitutional litigation system is inadequate in the
context of Fifth Amendment Takings Law. One commentator summarizes the
problem by stating,
Any synthesis of the Court's takings procedures, takings law and
takings remedies leaves litigants with an unusually high level of
risk and uncertainty during the years of disagreement and can
lead to the financial devastation of one or both parties.
Landowners and Regulators must make a variety of critical
decisions early in the regulatory process without knowing the
legal consequences of those decisions and without knowing how
many years it will be before they will learn those legal
consequences. "'
B. Legislation
Current legislation is also fraught with problems. In general, the passage
of any takings statute has the potential to undermine important health, safety and
environmental laws. More specifically, the compensation and the assessment
approaches each have their own disadvantages.
Especially disturbing is the potential application of takings legislation to
every action undertaken by the federal government.'92 Such a broad sweep
threatens to undermine many of the basic protections that guard American
citizens." 3 If the government faces potential liability for every action that impacts
private land, it will be less inclined to take that action unless it has the money to
pay for it. The result is the weakening of civil rights and disability laws, OSHA
worker safety requirements and health care reform and even basic zoning
requirements-all under the premise of protecting property rights which will
instead deprive the public of the protection of its rights to health and safety.'94
Succinctly put, "if giant redwoods were cut, if animal or plant species ceased to
exist, or if water and air quality substantially deteriorated, each of us would be
poorer."' 95
191. Id. at 4.
192. See, e.g., S. 2019, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(e)(1)(B) (1994).
193. This threat raises the additional issue of whether takings legislation potentially violates the
government's system of checks and balances. Essentially, takings statutes give enforcement agencies
the authority to act in both a legislative capacity (by determining whether or not to repeal a
regulatory statute) and ajudicial capacity (by interpreting Fifth Amendment constitutional law). See
Martinez, supra note 43, at 339.
194. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, How FAR WILL "TAKINGS" BILLS GO? (1994).
195. Martinez, supra note 43, at 342.
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1. Disadvantages of the Compensation Approach
Although compensation legislation reduces uncertainty, it does not
completely eliminate it. By establishing a set point that triggers the government's
duty to pay just compensation, this legislation seems to eliminate the uncertainty
that results from litigation.'96 However, in reality, this compensation provision
merely shifts the focus of litigation.'97 Whereas in traditional constitutional
litigation the issue is whether the government must pay compensation at all,
pursuant to a compensation model, the issue becomes whether the value of the
property is diminished by the statutorily set percentage.'98 Thus, although
compensation laws will reduce the number of regulatory takings claims per se,
litigation will increase for determining the diminution in value of the land.'99
And, as in the case of traditional regulatory takings claims, parties will need to
speculate as to the outcome of these "50% or more diminution in value" claims,
especially in light of the likely conflicting opinions of many expert appraisers."'
Furthermore, compensation laws unfairly weigh the interests of property
owners more heavily than those of the general public. Most problematic about
the "compensation" version of legislation is its failure to consider the
environmental perspective. By replacing the traditional criteria for evaluating a
landowner's claim for compensation with the sole consideration of whether the
value of the property is sufficiently diminished, compensation laws unfairly weigh
the rights of property owners more heavily than the need to protect the
environment.2 '
2. Disadvantages of the Assessment Approach
Similar to the judicial remedy, passage of an assessment law presents the
potential for increased costs. Opponents of assessment bills claim that they will
cause a "fiscal and bureaucratic nightmare."20 2  The argument is that these
"budget busters" will require taxpayer dollars to create new bureaucracy and red
tape in order to conduct essentially "meaningless" takings analyses. 2 3 According
196. Lavelle, supra note 32, at 1.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. (stating that compensation bills "could result in a flood of claims against the
government [because] 'you can always find an appraiser who will say your land would have been
worth so much."').
200. Id.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 89-107.
202. SeeNATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, ATroRNEYs GENERAL SPEAK OuTAGAINSTTAKINGS
LEGISLATION (1994).
203. See BUDGEr BusTER, supra note 17.
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to Senator Leahy, "these [TIAs] might be intellectually stimulating, if they were
not so expensive ... A conservative estimate puts [the cost to the government
and taxpayers of conducting TIAs under this bill] at over $150 million a year."2 4
IV. REMEDY
Clearly none of these proposed solutions is perfect. There are benefits
and drawbacks to each one. The challenge is to pick the solution that represents
a fair and realistic balancing and acknowledgement of both the value of property
rights and the need to preserve our fragile environment. A carefully tailored
legislative assessment approach that targets specific agency actions best fulfills
this objective. In addition, Congress should continue to revise its environmental
statutes to ensure adequate balancing between these competing interests.
In order to avoid completely the risk that such a statute will be used as
a tool to destroy public interest laws, Congress must carefully tailor its assessment
bill to apply only to specific agencies. For example, if Congress means to require
a TIA for implementation of the ESA, it should do so clearly by making the bill
applicable to "the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior as
it implements [the] ESA." Finally, it is important to remember that, to the extent
that any of these public interest laws do constitute takings of private property, the
Constitution already requires the payment of just compensation.2 5
Although these bills do not provide property owners with any additional
protection, they will help agency personnel better understand the result of their
actions from both the fiscal and property rights standpoints.2"6 Thus, although the
assessment bill will initially increase agency expenditures, in the long run it
should reduce overall costs. Requiring governments to conduct, at a minimum,
a takings assessment analysis will enable regulations effecting takings to be
identified and modified before going into effect. This informed decisionmaking
will reduce the extent of inadvertent regulatory takings, actually saving
government agencies and municipalities money currently spent defending lawsuits
and paying uncontemplated compensation awards.20 7
Many opponents to "takings" legislation (both "compensation" and
"assessment" bills) fear that due to the high cost of implementing these schemes,
204. Other estimates are less intimidating. One state Fish and Wildlife Service estimated the cost
of implementing this type of statute as between $2.6 million and $14.8 million. Another state
estimated only a "minimal" additional cost. See Martinez, supra note 43, at 342.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
206. See Private PropertyRights Bill Draws DividedResponse During House Hearing, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA) No. 212, at D-39 (Nov. 4, 1993).
207. See 140 CONG. REc. S5928 (daily ed. May 19, 1994). "I suspect this amendment will cost
less than its critics anticipate. I also expect substantial savings from the reduction in litigation
fighting unconstitutional takings." Id. (statement of Sen. Kassebaum during the debate on safe
drinking water).
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201America will no longer be able to afford to protect its natural resources.
However, unless another means of resolving the issue is discovered, "takings"
legislation must be passed or America will no longer have any legislation to
protect natural resources. Because the grassroots property rights movement is
growing so strong, it poses the risk of eliminating environmental protection
statutes unless these statutes can accommodate their legitimate concerns. The
ongoing controversy over "takings" and over whether or not to pass an
"assessment" bill effectively blocked the passage of much needed environmental
legislation during the 103d Congressional session. 2 9  According to one
commentator, much of this legislation was "stymied by a burgeoning private
property rights movement" and "congressional support for adding cost-benefit
analysis requirements to environmental statutes." '2 °  Of the numerous
environmental laws in much need of revision, the only major piece of legislation
that passed in the 103d Congress was the California Desert Protection Act.2" A
specific example of how the tension between the two groups created "legislative
paralysis" is the withdrawal of the National Biological Survey bill after advocates
of stronger property rights introduced an amendment restricting government
access to private property and forbidding authorities from using volunteers to
complete the survey.22 This amendment would have made the project too
difficult and costly to run.21 3
In fact, passing an "assessment" type of "takings" bill may actually
increase environmental protection. Landowners with vested interests in their land
have great incentives to protect it in order to maintain its value. However, if
protecting this land will actually reduce its value as a result of ESA and property
values will plummet if, for example, a listed species is found on the land, this
incentive will become a disincentive. In the words of one landowner, "I am
convinced that most people like wildlife, and they would go out of their way to
attract wildlife to their land, if they weren't likely to lose the use of their land if
they did this."214 Takings assessment bills assure landowners who wish to attract
208. SIERRA CLUB, TAKINGS LEGISLATION: THE WISE USE MOvEMENT'S ATTACK ON THE
ENVIRONMENT (1994).
209. See Kay, supra note 10, at 43; Camia, supra note 34, at 1062.
210. Kay, supra note 10, at 43.
211. California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (1994). See
Kenworthy & Lee, supra note 38, at A4.
212. Kay, supra note 10, at 43.
213. Id.
214. Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Clean
Water, Fisheries & Wildlife of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1994) [hereinafter ESA Hearings] (testimony of Mary Davidson, property owner in
Austin, Texas). "Many owners say privately, they don't want to make a home for protected red-
cockaded woodpeckers and the accompanying infringement of property rights. They're cutting trees
before they're old enough to be woodpecker habitat." Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Craig).
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wildlife on their own that their actions will not cause them to suffer an
unconstitutional taking.215
Finally, skeptics suggest that the true purpose for promulgating takings
legislation is "to get a carte blanche for unrestrained activities by large corporate
landowners and agribusinesses."216 They worry that the effect of the legislation
will be a massive unleashing of big business. Concededly, requiring a TIA
reduces inadvertent takings of property belonging to big businesses and thus may
in some instances facilitate development. However, this legislation will protect
small landowners with valid Fifth Amendment claims even more. Unlike big
businesses that possess the resources to litigate their claims, many small
landowners with valid Fifth Amendment claims lack sufficient funding to obtain
relief For example, Mary Davidson and her husband worked hard for nine years
to save enough money to build a home on 1.45 acres of undeveloped land in
Texas.217 However, because the FWS believed the land is a "suitable habitat
area" for the golden-cheeked warbler, a type of bird protected by the ESA, it
required the Davidsons to set aside land for a bird habitat before it would issue
a building pennit.218 The potential costs of complying with the requirements were
"astronomical."2 9 Indeed, the Texas Fish and Wildlife Service agreed: "The
procedure outlined by Congress in the 10(A) permit are not procedures the small
landowner can go through.""22
Similarly, due to designation of his land as wetlands, Robert Spiller of
Louisiana could not obtain the required permit to raise crawfish and harvest
cypress trees on his 160 acres.221 His resulting loss in crawfish sales is estimated
at $24,000.22 Takings legislation promises to help small landowners like Mary
Davidson and Robert Spiller more than big businesses.
In addition to a separate assessment statute, modifications to existing laws
will help to ensure an adequate balance between the environment and private
property. For example, proposals for the reauthorization of the ESA include
incentives to encourage property owners to voluntarily conserve habitats.2" A
recent amendment proposed by Senators Baucus and Chaffee provides Federal
grants to private landowners for taking steps beyond those required by the ESA
to conserve species' habitats.224 Other promising nonconfiscatory alternatives
215. See id.
216. Kay, supra note 10, at 43.




220. Id. (quoting Joe Johnson of the FWS).
221. Camia, supra note 34, at 1061.
222. Id.
223. See S. 1521, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1993) (authorizing federal grants to private persons
to assist them in preserving habitat).
224. S. 921, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1993).
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include developing tax incentives for property owners to preserve critical habitat
and creating transferable development rights to enable private entities to trade,
buy and sell the right to destroy habitat in exchange for protection or
improvement of habitat elsewhere.22 Furthermore, Congress might adjust
controversial environmental laws by exploring the possibility of pursuing
voluntary agreements between government and private landowners. For example,
California has successfully used voluntary agreements between the Department
of Fish and Game and landowners to protect sage-scrub habitat.226
V. CONCLUSION
The United States is founded on the premise that private property rights
are extremely valuable and among the fundamental rights of man.227 In the words
of James Madison, "in its larger and juster meaning, [property] embraces
everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right. '228 The Fifth
Amendment embraces this concept by protecting the rights of American citizens
to receive just compensation should the government deprive them of their
property. However, as with all other fundamental rights, such as freedom of
speech, there are limits to this protection. Just as it is inappropriate to scream
"Fire!" falsely in a crowded theater, it is inappropriate to destroy significant
environmental resources when developing land. 9 Indeed, "one of the hallmarks
of our system of government is that all rights are balanced and none are absolute.
Even the freedom to speak, which is the cornerstone of democracy, has its
limits.""23 The environmental arena is one that demands balancing. The need to
protect the health and welfare of American citizens through protection of the
environment is equally as important as the value of private property.
Senator Baucus, former chairman of the Committee on Environment and
Public Works, seems to understand the importance of abandoning the attitude that
one is either pro-environment or pro-private property. In urging the Senate to
continue working together to promote both the environment and to reduce
burdensome regulations, he stated, "We do not have to pit the environment
against the economy. Rather, if we work together, listen to legitimate arguments
on both sides and take creative approaches.., we can write environmental laws
that protect the environment and promote economic growth."231
225. Kamenar, supra note 174, at 7.
226. Id.
227. See 140 CONG. REc. S5927 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
228. Id. at S5930 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
229. See ESA Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of Sen. Craig analogizing restrictions on Fifth
Amendment rights to restrictions on freedom of speech).
230. 140 CONG. REc. S5923 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of Sen. Liebermann).
231. Id. at S5926 (statement of Sen. Baucus).
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Requiring agencies to assess and evaluate the impact of environmental
regulations on private property is a step in this direction. It is true that passage
of an assessment takings bill may involve initial expense to the implementing
agencies which may need to hire more lawyers and accountants to determine the
extent of expected liability. However, this expense will be offset in the long run
by decreased liability penalties, especially if the current trend favoring property
owners continues2 and regulators are subjected to high compensation awards
such as that awarded in Whitney Benefits. 3 In addition, "up front" TIAs will
help reduce the expense to property owners who "too often are presented with a
bureaucratic fait accompli" and are forced to vindicate their rights through costly
and time consuming lawsuits.13 ' Furthermore, after a thorough TIA has been
conducted, both property owners and regulators can rest more certain that an
unconstitutional taking has not occurred.
232. See supra text accompanying note 147.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
234. 140 CONG. REC. S5928 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
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